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This paper proposes a formal model of migration in which workers are heterogeneous
and markets are stochastically correlated. We derive and characterize the optimal migra-
tion pattern of a family. It is shown to depend on diﬀerences in expected earnings, costs
of migration, income risks, and more importantly market correlations. We show that mi-
gration can take place even when migrants earn less abroad and, more surprisingly, when
earnings in the foreign country are riskier for every member of the family. Moreover, it
may well be an optimal arrangement to have only dependents migrate, thus rationalizing
the recent dependent-oriented migration ﬂows from places like Hong Kong and Taiwan.
We also provide some evidence in support of our theory.
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For the past three decades, the theory of migration has been a growing ﬁeld in economics.
While migration may arise from social or political considerations, economists have been
able to demonstrate the importance of labor market factors in the migration process.
Studies, notably by Sjaastad (1962), Borjas (1989), and many others, view migration as
an investment in which the income gain along with other beneﬁts resulting from migration
must at least exceed the costs associated with it to justify the move, provided that there
are no institutional or political barriers inhibiting migration. Harris and Todaro (1970)
consider migration as a response to the urban-rural (which can also be interpreted as
foreign-home) wage diﬀerential in their two-sector model in which the urban employment
rate acts as an equilibrating force on migration.
Recent studies by Stark (1991) and others, known as the new economics of labor
migration, add a new dimension to the theory of migration. Since then, focus has been
shifted from individual-based to mutually interdependent family-based studies. Remit-
tances from migrants to their families at home and inter-personal income transfers among
family members are thus the results of collective migration decisions. Put diﬀerently, the
view of the family as the decision-making unit has been strongly emphasized in this part
of the literature. This new approach provides a more complex, but more realistic frame-
work in which intra-family tradeoﬀs and hence their eﬀects on migration behavior can be
fully analyzed.1 In the presence of uncertainty, Stark (1991) argues convincingly for the
importance of risks in family migration decisions. The decision to migrate in his model is
1For surveys of the “new economics” of migration, see Ghatak et. al. (1996), Massey et. al. (1993),
and especially Stark (1991).
1derived from risk diversiﬁcation, a result that is consistent with the theory of investment
in ﬁnancial economics.
For all of its accomplishments, we feel that the introduction of risks and the role
derived from it have not yet been fully explored in the literature. Nor has the pattern
of migration of a typical family in response to income risks across countries been thor-
oughly investigated, at least in a coherent theoretical model. By assuming a stochastic
foreign market and a deterministic domestic market, the existing theory is incapable of
addressing the eﬀects of market interactions on family migration decisions. Furthermore,
by assuming that family members are homogeneous (although market uncertainty may
aﬀect them diﬀerently), the relationship between family characteristics and migration
patterns has consequently been ignored. Given these shortcomings, the existing theory
of migration is not equipped to oﬀer an explanation for the observation that in some
families the breadwinners migrate to support the dependents at home, while in others
only their dependents migrate, leaving the breadwinners at home.
The purpose of this paper is to formulate a general model of migration under uncer-
tainty. Our main task is to investigate how the income risk in each country along with
their correlation interacts with the expected income of each family member to inﬂuence
the migration decision of the family. In our model, we allow family members to diﬀer
in productivities. Their expected incomes in both countries are subject to some random
but correlated disturbances.2 As a result, we are able not only to explore the impact of
country risks on migration, but also to characterize the migration pattern of a family. In
2Note that the assumption of heterogeneous labor is also employed in Borjas (1987) in his “individual”
migration model. However, as far as the “family” migration models are concerned, homogeneity of labor
is assumed. This restrictive assumption is relaxed in the present paper.
2particular, we can explain why in some Asian countries (e.g., Hong Kong and Taiwan),
dependents (who have no income at home as well as abroad) migrate while their (more
productive) parents stay home. Furthermore, we can also show that some members in a
family may migrate even if every migrant makes less in the foreign country. This holds
true even when the income risk in the foreign country is higher than that in the home
country. To this end, we emphasize the role of the income correlation between countries
on the family migration decision. A negative market correlation helps reduce the overall
risk and enhances the incentive to migrate. Consequently, migration may take place even
when migrants’ incomes actually fall after migration and/or the income risk in the foreign
country is higher than that in the home country.
The idea that income risk, or even correlation of incomes between regions, can inﬂu-
ence the migration decision is not new (see, e.g., Stark and Levhari 1982). Using data
on marital arrangements among rural Indian households, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989)
test the hypothesis that marital migration serves to mitigate income risk in an environ-
ment where insurance markets are underdeveloped and there are spatially covariant risks.
Although they do not set up a formal theoretical model for it, the basic insight that in-
come risks, together with the covariance of the risks, strongly inﬂuence the mobility of
people across regions and countries is clearly embedded in their paper. The paper that
is closest to ours is Daveri and Faini (1999). They consider a three-country model and
study the inﬂuence on the migration ﬂow of (i) an increase in the correlation between
home and foreign incomes, and (ii) an increase in the home income risk. They also use
Southern Italian migration data to test and conﬁrm their theoretical results. Similar
to our paper, they ﬁnd that the correlation of incomes between countries (regions) in-
3ﬂuences the migration decision. Unlike our paper, they do not attempt to characterize
the optimal migration pattern of a family. In view of these existing studies, the main
contribution of this paper is essentially to provide a formal model of migration behavior
under uncertainty and to characterize the optimal family migration pattern as a function
of expected incomes, country risks, and market correlations. A unique feature of our
m o d e li st h a ti tc a no ﬀer a coherent explanation for two antithetical patterns of family
migration: breadwinner-oriented migration and dependent-oriented migration.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model and charac-
terizes the optimal migration pattern. Section 3 investigates the properties of the model,
conducts a sensitivity analysis, and examines the role of some key assumptions in the
model. Section 4 presents some empirical evidence that are supportive of our theory.
Section 5 concludes the paper. Detailed mathematical proofs are provided in the Ap-
pendix.
2. The Model
Consider a family consisting of n members. There are two countries, home and foreign, for
the family to allocate its members. For each member, the cost of migration is c>0, which
includes the cost of moving to and working in the foreign country. Let N = {1,2,...,n}
denote the set of family members, H and F denote the set of family members in the home
country and the foreign country, respectively, then H ⊆ N, F ⊆ N, H ∪ F = N, and
H ∩ F = φ.L e t nH and nF be the number of elements in H and F, respectively. The
3As noted above, recent migration ﬂows from Taiwan and Hong Kong have been mostly dependents.
Neither the human capital model of Sjaastad (1962) and Borjas (1989) nor the “new” economic theory of
migration of Stark (1991) attempts to explain this phenomenon. The motivation behind this migration
pattern may have nothing to do with income gains as the dependents earn practically nothing abroad.
4income (or wage) of member i is hi if he stays in the home country and fi if he moves
to the foreign country. Let ri = fi − hi denote the gain (or loss) in income if member i
migrates to the foreign country, i ∈ N. Without loss of generality, we order i such that
r1 ≥ r2 ≥ ... ≥ rn. A small or negative value of ri does not imply that i has a small or
negative income in the foreign country. It only means that the gain from migration is
low or negative for i, and in fact the income of i m a yb eh i g hi nb o t hc o u n t r i e s . 4
In addition to the deterministic components hi and fi, each individual’s welfare is
subject to a country-speciﬁc random shock denoted by εH in the home country and εF in
the foreign country. The random variables εF and εH are assumed to be correlated. Let
yi denote member i’s income, then yi = hi + εH in the home country and yi = fi + εF
in the foreign country. This formulation assumes that the random shock is additive and
that income can be added up with other measures (political or social) of welfare. Notice
that the random shock in each country aﬀects everyone in that country in the same
way, i.e., neither εH nor εF depends on i. Each random shock is supposed to capture
the variations in each country’s economic, political, and social situations that aﬀect the
welfare (including income) of its residents. Therefore, εF and εH are interpreted as
country risks rather than individual speciﬁcs h o c k s .T h i sa s s u m p t i o nd i ﬀerentiates our
model from the new economics of migration (Katz and Stark 1986, Stark 1991), which is
4By deﬁning fi and hi as income only, we have implicitly excluded all other possible variables that may
aﬀect individual welfare, e.g., amenities. Nevertheless, our model can readily be extended to incorporate
these variables. For instance, we can deﬁne fi = yiF + βziF and hi = yiH + βziH;w h e r eyij is member
i0s income in country j (j = H,F) and zij denotes the amenities member i enjoys in country j. β > 0 is
the rate of transformation between amenities and income as they (in unit terms) may not generate the
same utility. In this modiﬁed case, the purpose of migration is not only to pursue higher income and
diversify risk but also to seek a higher level of amenities. Since in this paper we are mainly concerned
with the former, the amenity aspect of family welfare will for the most part be ignored. This means
that we implicitly assume that the level of amenities a member (and in particular a dependent) enjoys is
the same in both countries. Our results essentially demonstrate that there is still motivation to migrate
(namely, risk diversiﬁcation) even if the level of amenities is not a concern.
5mainly concerned with the migration decision under individual risks.




























Assume that the family has a mean-variance utility function U(F) given by
U(F)=E (I) − kV (I), (1)
where E (I) is the expected family income, V (I) is the variance, and k>0 measures
the degree of risk aversion of the family. The greater the value of k, the more risk averse
is the family.5 The objective of the family is to allocate its members between the two
countries (home and foreign) so as to maximize family utility, i.e., it chooses F (and H)
to maximize U(F).
The assumption that the family acts as a coherent unit which sets out to maximize
a family utility function can be justiﬁed in two diﬀerent ways. First, the main family
migration patterns that we seek to explain in this paper are particularly pervasive in
societies where the families are led by a dominant head (usually the father as in the
case of patriarchy). In these societies, it is not unreasonable to assume that there exists
5Although U depends on many variables other than F, we only highlight F here because it is suﬃcient
to convey the ideas. We employ a mean-variance utility because it oﬀers a precise measure of riskiness
and it enables us to derive tractable analytical results. This speciﬁcation has been used in other studies
as well (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). It can be justiﬁed if the underlying utility function is
quadratic or if the income is normally distributed (see Huang and Litzenberger, 1988). For a general
utility function, we cannot separate the expected utility into mean and variance, so the expected utility
may not depend on mean and variance only. However, as long as the family prefers income and abhors
risk, its desire to balance the mean and variance of income still exists. Qualitatively, our results and
conclusions should not be aﬀected by using a more general utility function, as long as we can deﬁne a
precise measure of riskiness.
6an authoritative head or benevolent dictator in the family who controls the migration
decision of its members based on some aggregate measure of utility.
Second, the family utility function U(F) can be derived from aggregating individual
utility functions under certain conditions. Suppose every family member has the same
mean-variance utility function u(yi)=E(yi)−aV (yi),i∈ N, where a measures the degree
of risk aversion. Assuming that the family allocates income to achieve optimal risk shar-
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/n =[ E(I) − kV(I)]/n = U(F)/n, where k ≡ a/n. Consequently,
maximizing the individual utility function u(yi) with respect to yi for member i is equiv-
alent to maximizing the family utility function U(F) with respect to I. In other words,
each member’s objective essentially coincides with the family’s objective.6 In this case,
the degree of risk aversion for the entire family decreases with the family size (k = a/n),
which is very much expected because of the risk pooling eﬀect.
Although the above two justiﬁcations (dominant head versus family risk-sharing) have
diﬀerent meanings, all the main results of this paper hold regardless of whether k is a
constant or equals a/n. Thus we will simply use the general symbol k when there is no
need to distinguish between the two cases. When the two cases do diﬀer or when the case
k = a/n enhances interpretation, we will state it explicitly in the paper.
Assume E(εF)=E(εH)=0 , V (εF)=σ2
F, V (εH)=σ2
H,a n dcov(εF,εH)=σHF.























hi.L e t F∗ and H∗ denote the optimal solution to (2), and n∗
F denote
the optimal number of migrants. The existence of a solution to (2) is obvious as there
are only a ﬁnite number of ways (i.e., 2n)t oa s s i g nn people between two countries. We
assume that a member will stay home if the family utility remains the same regardless of
whether that member stays home or migrates. Throughout this paper, we assume that
V (εF − εH) > 0.7
Let ∆Ul denote the marginal beneﬁt of migrating the (l+1)-st member to the foreign
country, given that the ﬁrst l members have already migrated, then ∆Ul ≡ U({1,...,l +
1}) − U({1,...,l}),l=0 ,1,2,...,n − 1. Throughout this paper, we deﬁne {1,2,...,l} = φ
if l =0 . Substituting (2) into the right-hand side of ∆Ul and simplifying,
∆Ul = rl+1 − c − k
©
(2l +1 ) σ
2
F − [2(n − l) − 1]σ
2
H +2 ( n − 2l − 1)σHF
ª
. (3)
Diﬀerencing the marginal utility of migration ∆Ul,








=( rl+1 − rl) − 2kV(εF − εH) < 0, (4)
as rl+1 ≤ rl and V (εF − εH) > 0 by assumption. Thus, the marginal utility of migration
strictly diminishes with the number of migrants.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal equilibrium migration pattern for
an interior solution.
Proposition 1 Let l be such that ∆Ul−1 > 0 and ∆Ul ≤ 0, then F ∗ = {1,2,...,l} and
H∗ = {l +1 ,...,n}.
7This assumption will hold if either σF 6= σH or σHF 6= σHσF (i.e., εF and εH are not perfectly
positively correlated). This follows from the fact that V (εF − εH)=σ2
F + σ2
H − 2σHF =( σF − σH)2 +
2(σHσF − σHF). As σHσF ≥ |σHF|, therefore V (εF − εH) > 0 if either σF 6= σH or σHF 6= σHσF.
8Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x .
Proposition 1 shows that there is a unique way of allocating the family members
between home and abroad to maximize the family utility. If migration is to occur, the
member with the highest foreign-home income diﬀerential (r1) will be the ﬁrst one to
migrate. The second one to migrate is the one with the second highest foreign-home in-
come diﬀerential (r2). In other words, the order of migration follows exactly the order of
i. Migration takes place among those members with higher foreign-home income diﬀeren-
tials. The process will continue until the marginal beneﬁt of migration turns negative. In
the presence of country-speciﬁc risks and heterogeneous family members, the proposition
reveals that the foreign-home income diﬀerential remains an important determinant of
migration. This result is broadly consistent with the “classical theory” of migration (e.g.,
Harris and Todaro, 1970) in that the income gap between two regions is shown to be the
main impetus for migration. Nevertheless, we will demonstrate below that our analysis
goes beyond the classical one and our ﬁndings are also substantially diﬀerent.
3. Optimal Migration Pattern and Related Issues
In this section, we will investigate the properties of the model, conduct a sensitivity
analysis, and re-examine the results when some assumptions are relaxed.
3.1 First and Last Movers
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal migration pattern for an interior solution. In this
section, we will examine the conditions for an interior solution (0 <n ∗
F <n )a sw e l la s
the conditions for a corner solution (n∗
F =0or n∗
F = n). These conditions will reveal
some important and unique features of our model.
9From (3), the marginal beneﬁt of migrating the ﬁrst, and thus the relatively most
productive, member to the foreign country is given by
∆U0 = U({1}) − U(φ)




















F > 0; otherwise n∗
F =0 . Hence, there will not be any migration unless (6) holds.
As a benchmark, consider the special case where σ2
H = σHF =0 , i.e., the home income
is deterministic (as in the case of the new economics of migration). Then (6) reduces to
r1 − c>k σ2
F, implying that the foreign-home income diﬀerential net of migration costs
must exceed kσ2
F for migration to take place. This, however, is no longer true in our
general setting. Even if r1 − c<0 (and thus ri − c<0 for all i =2 ,3,...,n), (6) can
s t i l lh o l dw h e n( a )σ2
H is suﬃciently larger than [σ2
F +2 ( n − 1)σHF]/(2n − 1),o r( b )
σ2
H > [σ2
F +2 ( n − 1)σHF]/(2n−1) and k is suﬃciently large.8 The intuition behind this
result is as follows. If the home country is so unstable that condition (a) holds, then it
makes sense to migrate even if the foreign income is lower than the home income. The
loss resulting from a lower income abroad is more than compensated by a reduction in
the variation of income. If condition (b) holds (that is, when the family is very sensitive
to income variation), a small reduction in total income variation (from migration) can
more than compensate for the fall in income. Notice that, even if r1−c<0 and σ2
H < σ2
F
(the foreign country is riskier than the home country), (6) can still hold.
8For the case where k = a/n, this requires that a be suﬃciently large, holding n constant.
10From (3), the marginal beneﬁt of migrating the last, and thus the relatively least
productive, member to the foreign country is
∆Un−1 = U(N) − U({1,...,n − 1})




















F = n; otherwise n∗
F <n .Complete family migration occurs if (8) holds. Even
if rn − c<0, (8) can still hold if σ2
F < σHF and k is suﬃciently large.9 The result has
an intuitive interpretation. Given σ2
F < σHF < σ2
H, it is safer (in terms of risk) for the
members to move to the foreign country. If the family is suﬃc i e n t l yr i s ka v e r s e ,t h e na l l
members will migrate even though the foreign income is lower than the home income for
every member. In this case, diversiﬁcation will not mitigate, but instead exacerbate, the
risk in total family income.
If (6) holds but (8) does not hold, then we have an interior solution, i.e., 0 <n ∗
F <n .
There is an important diﬀerence between (6) and (8). While (6) can still hold even when
r1 − c<0 and σ2
H < σ2
F, ( 8 )c a n n o th o l di frn −c<0 and σ2
H < σ2
F.10 This is intuitively
reasonable because the family gains nothing from moving all its members abroad when
the foreign income is lower than the home income for every member and the foreign
country is also riskier than the home country.
9The proof is as follows. Since σ2
F +σ2
H−2σHF = V (εF −εH) > 0, σ2
F < σHF implies that σHF < σ2
H.
It follows that (2n − 1)σ2
F − 2(n − 1)σHF − σ2
H =( 2 n − 1)(σ2
F − σHF)+( σHF − σ2
H) < 0.




H − 2σHF = V (εF − εH) > 0 implies that
σ2
F + σ2
F − 2σHF > 0, hence σ2
F − σHF > 0. Consequently, (2n − 1)σ2
F − 2(n − 1)σHF − σ2
H > (2n −
1)σ2
F − 2(n − 1)σHF − σ2
F =2 ( n − 1)(σ2
F − σHF) > 0. Hence, the right-hand side of (8) is positive but
the left-hand side is negative, so (8) cannot hold.
11The above results can be seen crystal-clear if we consider the special case where
k = a/n and n is large. Substituting k = a/n and letting n →∞ , (5) and (7) can be
simpliﬁed to




∆Un−1 = U(N) − U({1,...,n − 1})=rn − c +2 a(σHF − σ
2
F), (10)
respectively. It is clear from (9) that the relatively most productive member can still
migrate even if r1 − c<0 and σ2
H < σ2
F. For any given values of r1 and c,m i g r a t i o n
will occur if σHF is suﬃciently negative.11 That is, as long as there is enough negative
covariance between the country risks, there will be migration. Similarly, (10) shows that
the relatively least productive member can still migrate even if rn −c<0, provided that
σ2
H > σ2
F.12 Clearly, (9) and (10) indicate that a suﬃciently negative σHF will spur migra-
tion but forestall complete migration, giving rise to an interior solution. Alternatively,
if the risk aversion a is suﬃciently high and the covariance σHF is moderately positive
(such that both σHF < σ2
H and σHF < σ2
F hold), then the family will also migrate some
but not all of its members.
The main results can now be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) If (6) holds, then n∗
F > 0 (i.e., there is migration); otherwise n∗
F =0 .
Migration can still occur even if the foreign income is lower than the home income and
the foreign country risk is higher than the home country risk.
11Empirically, a negative correlation in income between countries is not impossible. For example, the
Vietnam War had brought an economic boom to many Asian countries, although it was an economic
disaster for Vietnam.
12From footnote 10, σ2
H < σ2
F implies σ2
F − σHF > 0. Thus, rn − c +2 a(σHF − σ2




12(ii) If (8) holds, then n∗
F = n (i.e., complete migration); otherwise n∗
F <n .Even if the
foreign income is lower than the home income for every family member, it is possible for
the entire family to move abroad, provided that the foreign country risk is lower than the
home country risk.
The proposition illustrates how the inclusion of country risks can generate new results
that are considerably diﬀerent from the prevailing ones in the literature. Our analysis
is closely related to the new economics of migration (Stark 1991) in that uncertainty
serves as a key factor motivating family migration. However, our analysis is diﬀerent in
two aspects. First, Stark and others assume that markets are stochastically independent,
thus ruling out the possible eﬀect of market relationships on individuals’ migration deci-
sions. On the contrary, we allow markets to be stochastically correlated and the market
uncertainty aﬀects individuals within the same country in the same way. The risks in our
model are country risks, as opposed to individual risks in Stark’s setup. The correlation
between home and foreign markets plays an important role in family migration decisions.
In Stark’s model, for someone to migrate the foreign income must be higher than the
home income in order to oﬀset the risk involved. We, however, show that one may mi-
g r a t ee v e ni ft h ef o r e i g ni n c o m ei sl o w e ra n dt h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r yr i s ki sa l s oh i g h e r .T h e
foreign country risk is not necessarily “bad” because the overall risk can be mitigated if
the home and foreign incomes are negatively correlated.13 Second, Stark assumes that
family members are homogeneous. In our model family members are heterogeneous with
respect to their earning abilities. The question of who to migrate becomes an important
13It should, however, be emphasized that although Stark (1991) does not investigate the role of co-
variance in a theoretical model, its role is clear in some empirical works. See, for example, Rosenzweig
and Stark (1989).
13issue. Individual heterogeneity is a unique feature of our model and it is a key element
in explaining some recent and distinct family migration pattern.
3.2 Incentive to Migrate
In this section, we will present some sensitivity results on the incentive (propensity) to
migrate, as measured by the marginal utility of migration ∆Ul. It is straightforward to
derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (i) ∂∆Ul/∂(ri − c) > 0, ∂∆Ul/∂σ2
F < 0, and ∂∆Ul/∂σ2
H > 0.
(ii) If σ2
H > σHF > σ2
F, then ∂∆Ul/∂k>0. If σ2
H < σHF < σ2
F, then ∂∆Ul/∂k<0.
Replacing ∂∆Ul/∂k with ∂∆Ul/∂a, these results also hold for the case where k = a/n.
(iii) Let ∆Un
l denote the marginal utility of migration ∆Ul when there are n mem-





H −σHF) R 0 if and only if σ2





(iv) ∂∆Ul/∂σHF =2 k(−n +2 l +1 )R 0 if and only if l R (n − 1)/2.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3(i) shows that the home variance σ2
H encourages migration while the
foreign variance σ2
F discourages it. The incentive to migrate increases with the foreign
income fi and decreases with the home income hi as well as the migration cost c.P r o p o -
sition 3(ii) indicates that a more risk averse family does not necessarily have a higher
incentive to migrate its members. The propensity to migrate will increase (decrease)
with the degree of risk aversion if the home country is riskier (less risky) than the foreign
country.
14Proposition 3(iii) reveals that the impact of family size on the incentive to migrate
depends on whether the risk aversion parameter is a function of family size. If k does not
depend on n, as in the dominant head model, then the propensity to migrate increases
with the family size if and only if the home variance σ2
H is larger than the covariance
σHF.14 However, if k = a/n, as in the family risk-sharing model, then the incentive to
migrate increases with the family size unambiguously and unconditionally. Even though
the eﬀects of k and n on the incentive to migrate may move in opposite directions, the
net eﬀect turns out to be unambiguously positive.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ek = a/n, the family’s risk aversion k will become very small as n gets
large. Does this imply that the risk diversiﬁcation role of migration will vanish as n tends





(a/n)=0 .15 In other words, the variance of income V (I) approaches inﬁnity
faster than the rate at which the risk aversion a/n goes to zero. Consequently, (a/n)V (I)
will not disappear from the family utility function, hence the role of risk diversiﬁcation
will not vanish as n gets large. To the contrary, risk diversiﬁcation becomes even more
important to the family as n grows because the income variance, which grows at the
rate of n2, rises much more rapidly than n. T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h es e c o n dp a r to f
Proposition 3(iii) in which the incentive to migrate is found to be strictly increasing in n
unconditionally. Put diﬀerently, if the risk diversiﬁcation role of migration vanishes as n
14If σHF < 0 or σ2
H > σ2
F, then σ2
H − σHF > 0 (the proof for σ2
H > σ2
F ⇒ σ2
H − σHF > 0 is identical
to the one for σ2
F > σ2
H ⇒ σ2
F − σHF > 0 in footnote 10). This result is intuitively reasonable. If the
country risks are negatively correlated or if the home country risk is higher than the foreign country risk,
then a bigger family will have more incentive to migrate because the risk of staying home is higher and
migration helps reduce the overall risk. On the other hand, σ2
H−σHF < 0 if and only if σ2
H < σHF < σ2
F.
In this case, the incentive to migrate decreases with the family size because the foreign country is riskier
than the home country.
15This result holds regardless of the choice of nF, provided that the country risks are not perfectly
negatively correlated. A proof is provided in the Appendix.
15tends to inﬁnity, then the propensity to migrate will not increase with n unconditionally.
The result for Proposition 3(iv) may not appear to be obvious at ﬁrst. It will become
transparent if we ﬁrst examine the eﬀect of σHF on U({1,2,..,l}). From (2), we know that
∂U({1,2,...,l})/∂σHF = −2k(n − l)l<0. An increase in the covariance σHF will reduce
the family utility U({1,2,...,l}) through increasing the income variance V (I). Thus a
higher covariance is bad for the family. Now we examine the eﬀe c to ft h ec o v a r i a n c eo n
the marginal family utility ∆Ul. Clearly, ∂∆Ul/∂σHF =2 k(−n +2 l +1 ) . Therefore, the
eﬀect of σHF on ∆Ul depends on the magnitude of l. This dependence originates solely
from the total covariance 2l(n − l)σHF in U({1,2,...,l}) as it is the only term in U that
contains both l and σHF. Again, a higher total covariance is bad for the family. For any
given n, the total covariance l(n − l)σHF increases with l when l is smaller than n/2,
reaches a maximum at l = n/2, and decreases with l when l is larger than n/2. Using
these results, we can now provide an intuitive interpretation for Proposition 3(iv). If the
majority of the family stays home (l<(n − 1)/2), then an increase in the covariance
σHF will reduce the incentive to migrate ∆Ul because sending more members abroad
(increasing l) will further increase the total covariance 2l(n−l)σHF, thereby lowering the
family utility U. On the other hand, if the majority of the family has already moved
abroad (l>(n − 1)/2), then a higher covariance will encourage more migration because
sending more members abroad will reduce the total covariance, thereby increasing the
family utility. In both cases, the family beneﬁts from reducing the total covariance
2l(n − l)σHF.
As shown in (6), the presence of a correlation between the country risks is neither
necessary nor suﬃcient for migration to take place. However, Proposition 3(iv) shows that
16∂∆U0/∂σHF = −2k(n − 1) for the relatively most productive member (l =0for i =1 )
and ∂∆Un−1/∂σHF =2 k(n − 1) for the relatively least productive member (l = n − 1
for i = n). Therefore, the smaller (more negative) is σHF, the more likely that the ﬁrst
member (i =1 )will migrate and the less likely that the last member (i = n) will move
abroad. Hence, as u ﬃciently negative σHF will initiate migration but inhibit complete
migration. This result echoes the one obtained from (9) and (10) for the special case
where k = a/n and n →∞a sd i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n3 . 1 .
3.3 Dependent Migration
In the past two decades or so, there has been a surge in dependent-oriented migration from
some Asian countries. The unique feature of this type of migration pattern is that, after
af a m i l yl a n d e di naf o r e i g nc o u n t r y ,t h ef a ther returned to his home country, leaving
his wife and children behind. The breadwinner returned home while the dependents
remained abroad. This new phenomenon is quite widespread among Taiwan and Hong
Kong immigrants in a number of countries, e.g., Canada, the United States, New Zealand,
and Australia (see Section 4 for detailed evidence). To many observers, this is unthinkable,
particularly because the immigrants are from the regions that put a strong emphasis on
family values.
Neither the classical nor the new theory of migration provides a satisfactory explana-
tion for dependent migration. Dependents usually do not earn any income in either the
home country or the foreign country, therefore dependent migration cannot be explained
in terms of the diﬀerence in expected income between the two countries as suggested by
the classical theory of migration. Nor can it be explained in terms of the diversiﬁcation
of individual risk as suggested by the new theory of migration because dependents have
17no earnings to oﬀset the risk incurred in migration. In their current formulations, both
the classical theory and the new theory are only concerned with the migration of workers,
therefore they are incapable of explaining dependent migration. We will examine in this
section whether our model can account for the migration of dependents.
Let M0 = {i ∈ N | fi = hi =0 } and M = N \ M0.16 We will call the members
in M0 dependents because they have no income in either country. We will also call the
members in M productive members. Let M+ = {i | ri > 0},M − = {i | ri < 0}, and
m0 = the number of elements in M0 (i.e., the total number of dependents in the family).
The optimal migration policy described in Proposition 1 calls for the family to migrate
its members in descending order of their foreign-home income diﬀerentials. The process
starts with members in M+ (i.e., those with positive ri). If it remains proﬁtable after all
the members in M+ have moved, then the members in M0 (i.e., dependents) will follow.
Again, if the marginal beneﬁt continues to be positive after migrating all the dependents,
then those in M− will be next. That is, a dependent can migrate even before a productive
member (who earns more at home than abroad). It is clear that dependent migration is
not to increase family income (as ri =0∀i ∈ M0), but to diversify risk. The following
proposition gives the conditions under which only dependents in the family migrate.
Proposition 4 Only dependents will migrate, i.e., F ∗ ⊆ M0,i fa n do n l yi ft h ef o l l o w i n g
three conditions hold:
(C4a) M+ = φ (i.e., ri < 0 for all i ∈ M),
(C4b) ∆U0 = −c − k [σ2
F +2 ( n − 1)σHF − (2n − 1)σ2
H] > 0, and
(C4c) ∆Um0 = rm0+1−c−k{(2m0 +1 ) σ2
F − [2(n − m0) − 1]σ2
H +2 ( n − 2m0 − 1)σHF} ≤
16Since it is only the change in income (ri)t h a ta ﬀects the migration decision, one can relax the
assumption by deﬁning M0 to be the members with fi = hi.
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Therefore, if all productive members earn more at home than abroad, at least half of the
family members are dependents, and the covariance between the home and foreign country
risks is suﬃciently negative, then only dependents will migrate.
Proof:S e eA p p e n d i x .
Conditions (C4a) and (C4b) guarantee that some dependents will move abroad, while
condition (C4c) ensures that all the productive members will stay home. If (C4a), (C4b),
and (C4c) hold, then only dependents will migrate.17 Not all dependents must migrate,
but those who migrate must be dependents. The proposition also oﬀers a scenario in which
dependent migration will occur. If at least half of the family members are dependents
(i.e., m0 ≥ n/2, hence n − 2m0 − 1 < 0) and the covariance between the country risks
σHF is suﬃciently negative, then conditions (C4b) and (C4c) will be satisﬁed. These
conditions are not stringent as they are not diﬃcult to meet in reality. For example, the
families migrated from Hong Kong and Taiwan tend to have more dependents than non-
dependents. Because of political uncertainties in Taiwan and Hong Kong, their country
risks will likely vary inversely with those of the receiving countries such as Canada and
the United States.
T h ea b o v er e s u l tc a nm o s te a s i l yb eg r a s p e di fw ec o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r ek = a/n
17A referee has suggested that (C4c) is too strong and the correct condition should be ∆Ul∗ ≤ 0 where
l∗ is the optimal number of dependents emigrated (i.e., (C4c) should be evaluated at the optimal l∗
instead of m0). We disagree with the suggestions for two reasons. First, if our condition ∆Um0 ≤ 0 is
too strong, it suggests that it is possible to have dependent migration with ∆Ul∗ ≤ 0 and ∆Um0 > 0 for
l∗ <m 0. Clearly, this is impossible because ∆Ul∗ ≤ 0 implies ∆Um0 < 0 as ∆Um0 < ∆Ul∗ for l∗ <m 0
(by (4)). Thus, as a suﬃcient condition, ∆Um0 ≤ 0 is not stronger than ∆Ul∗ ≤ 0. Second, as a practical
suﬃcient condition, ∆Ul∗ ≤ 0 i sn o ta sn e a ta s∆Um0 ≤ 0 because the former depends on an unknown
quantity l∗. It is necessary to ﬁnd the optimal l∗ in order to demonstrate or verify that ∆Ul∗ ≤ 0 is
satisﬁed. In contrast, it is much simpler and easier to check whether ∆Um0 ≤ 0 holds because m0 is
a known number. Thus, our condition ∆Um0 ≤ 0 is no less general but even simpler and more readily
veriﬁable than the condition ∆Ul∗ ≤ 0.
19and n is large. Let k = a/n and n →∞ , then (C4b) and (C4c) can be simpliﬁed to
∆U0 = −c−2a(σHF − σ2
H) > 0, and ∆Um0 = rm0+1−c−2a[(m0/n)σ2
F − (1 − m0/n)σ2
H+
(1 − 2m0/n)σHF] ≤ 0, respectively. Both inequalities will hold if σHF is suﬃciently neg-
ative and m0/n is greater than 1/2. The result is intuitively reasonable. A suﬃciently
negative σHF will trigger migration. From Proposition 1, we know that it will start from
the members with higher ri (i.e., dependents in this case). When there are more depen-
dents than productive members in the family, a suﬃciently negative σHF will eliminate
the propensity for productive members to migrate.
3.4 Individual Shock
T h u sf a rw eh a v eb e e nc o n c e r n e do n l yw i t ht h ee ﬀects of country risks on migration.
While there are shocks which aﬀect everyone’s income in the country in the same way,
there are also shocks which aﬀect people individually. In this section we will discuss how
the interplay of these two kinds of risk aﬀects family migration decisions.
To introduce individual risk ξi into the model, let the income of member i be given
by hi + εH + ξi if he stays home and fi + εF + ξi if he migrates. We assume that ξi and
ξj (i 6= j) are independent and E(ξi)=0 , for all i,j ∈ N. Following the literature on
t h en e we c o n o m i c so fm i g r a t i o n ,w ea s s u m et h a tξi =0if i ∈ H.T h a t i s , t h e r e i s n o
individual income risk if one stays in the home country.18 Hence, the family income is









hi−nFc. Let σi = V (ξi) and σiF = cov(ξi,εF),
18This assumption is not unrealistic because at an individual level, an individual’s income is more
uncertain in the foreign country than in the home country. Thus, V (ξi) is generally larger for i ∈ F than
for i ∈ H.H e r ew es i m p l yr e s c a l et h ev a r i a n c ea n da s s u m et h a tV (ξi)=0if i ∈ H. Incidentally, this
model virtually reduces to that in Katz and Stark (1986) when σ2
F = σ2
H =0and ri = r for all i.




























Now migration may be more costly because the family has to overcome the individual
income risks, in addition to the migration costs, the loss of income (if any), and the
country risks. Let us deﬁne si = ri − k(σ2
i +2 σiF),i∈ F, and call si the risk-adjusted



















Clearly, (12) is identical to (2) except that si replaces ri. Assume that si ≥ si+1
∀i =1 ,2,...,n − 1, then the characterization of the optimization problem in (12) is the
same as that given in Proposition 1. That is, the optimal allocation calls for migrating
the members with higher risk-adjusted foreign-home income diﬀerentials, and stops at
the one whose marginal beneﬁt of migration is non-positive. There are, however, at least
two diﬀerences between the two cases. First, the decision of which family member to
migrate depends not only on his/her foreign-home income diﬀerential (as in the case of
no individual risk), but also on the variance of the individual risk as well as its covariance
with the country risk. Second, while Propositions 3(i) and 3(iv) continue to hold here,
Propositions 3(ii) and 3(iii) will have to be modiﬁed because the dependence of si on k
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The country risk considered in the previous sections is additive in nature in the sense
that it exerts a uniform eﬀect on all individuals even though they have diﬀerent earning
capacities. In reality, individuals with higher earning capacities may have a higher stake
in political and social instabilities. As a result, uncertainty has a greater impact on
them than it does on those with lower earning capabilities. To study this possibility, we
consider in this section country risks that aﬀect income multiplicatively. Let the income
of member i in the foreign and home countries be fiεF and hiεH, respectively; where
E(εF)=E(εH)=1 , V (εF)=σ2
F, V (εH)=σ2
H,a n dcov(εF,εH)=σHF. Similar to the
additive risk case considered in the previous sections, this multiplicative risk does not





H, thus the income variance increases with the mean income of each
individual. In other words, a high-income individual will face a higher country risk than






































A comparison between (2) and (13) is now in order. When uncertainty is additive, the
risk terms in (2) depend only on the number of migrants nF. Consequently, the migration
pattern is driven only by individual diﬀerences in the foreign-home income diﬀerential
ri. When uncertainty is multiplicative, however; the risk terms in (13) depend not only
on the number of migrants nF, but also on their composition (i.e., who migrate). Apart
from the diﬀerence ri, the migration pattern is also aﬀected by fi and hi themselves.
22This considerably complicates our analysis. In particular, since high income also brings
in high risk, the family may be reluctant to migrate its high-income (in its relative sense)
members if the foreign risk is high enough to oﬀset any income gain from migration.
Since there are only a ﬁnite number of ways (2n) to allocate family members between
the home and foreign countries, (13) must have a solution. That is, an optimal migration
pattern must exist. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to characterize the optimum.
Proposition 5 below provides a set of suﬃcient conditions that will generate the same
migration pattern as given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 Under multiplicative uncertainty, if
(C5a) the dispersion in home income is suﬃciently small, and
(C5b) the foreign country risk is suﬃciently small,
then the optimal solution to (13) will be given by F∗ = {1,2,...,n∗
F} and H∗ = {n∗
F +
1,...,n}. In this case, migration takes place only among the productive members.
Proof: see Appendix.
Intuitively, condition (C5a) ensures that the diﬀerence in home income between mem-
bers is small (i.e., hj − ht small for any j 6= t, j,t ∈ N), thus marginalizing any possible
unfavorable eﬀect of uncertainty on higher-income individuals in the home country. As
a result, the diﬀerence in foreign income becomes the main consideration in determining
who should migrate. Condition (C5b) ensures a small income risk in the foreign coun-
try (i.e., σF small), thus minimizing the hesitation to move abroad. As a result, the
family’s migration decision will be determined according to the relative income of the
members and therefore those with high values of ri will migrate ﬁrst. Put diﬀerently, if
23σ2
F is too high, the family may prefer to keep home those members with relatively high
foreign income since the gain from higher income abroad may be more than oﬀset by
the loss resulting from a higher foreign income risk. Thus, conditions (C5a) and (C5b)
s e r v et om i n i m i z et h ei m p a c to ft h eh o m ei n c o m ea n dt h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r yr i s ko nt h e
migration decision problem so that the magnitude of the foreign income becomes the
only determinant.
In the additive-risk case, the total covariance is 2nFnHσHF (see (2)), which will be
minimized by setting (i) nF = nH = n/2 if σHF < 0, and (ii) nFnH =0(either nF =0
or nH =0 )i fσHF > 0. In other words, the family can minimize the total covariance by
equalizing (polarizing) the number of family members between the two countries if σHF <
(>)0 . The result is similar for the multiplicative-risk case. Here the total covariance




i∈H hi)σHF, which will be minimized by equalizing (polarizing)
the total home income
P
i∈H hi and the total foreign income
P
i∈F fi if σHF < (>)0 .
Finally, we wish to note that there is an important diﬀerence between the additive-risk
case and the multiplicative-risk case in terms of dependent migration. For the additive-
risk case, we have shown in Section 3.3 that it is possible to migrate only dependents.
For the multiplicative-risk case, however, the dependents will never migrate. The reason
is that if risk is multiplicative and dependents earn zero income regardless of where they
are, then their expected income as well as their income risk is zero everywhere. That
is, their contribution to the family utility is zero, therefore they become “irrelevant.”
Given that migration costs are strictly positive, dependents will never migrate, contrary
to our previous claim. Thus, the multiplicative-risk model is not capable of explaining
dependent migration. To overcome this shortcoming, a reasonable amendment would be
24to bring in amenities (e.g. education, social security, living environment, etc.) to the
family utility function.19 In this case, we can write the utility of member i as fiεF + θF
if he migrates and hiεH + θH if he stays home; where θF and θH are the nonstochastic
amenities provided by the foreign and home countries to their residents, respectively. By
replacing fi, hi and ri in (13) with fi +θF, hi +θH,a n dfi +θF −(hi +θH), respectively,
one obtains the family’s utility function. Since fi + θF − (hi + θH)=θF − θH for a
dependent (as fi = hi =0 ) , it is evident that dependents will migrate if and only if
θF − θH >c . Here, however, the rationale for dependents to migrate is to pursue better
amenities in the foreign country. This is distinctly diﬀerent from the additive-risk case
where dependent migration is purely driven by the desire to diversify income risk.20
4. Empirical Evidence
One unique feature of our model is that it can oﬀer a coherent explanation for two
antithetical patterns of family migration: breadwinner migration and dependent migra-
tion. While both the classical theory and the new theory of migration can easily explain
breadwinner migration, they cannot yet account for dependent migration. In our model,
whether only breadwinners or dependents migrate depends crucially on their relative po-
sitions in the ranking of the foreign-home income diﬀerentials ri. If breadwinners have
higher ri than dependents, then the former will migrate before the latter. This scenario
is more likely to occur if breadwinners have portable skills and there are little barriers
19Empirical evidence suggests that the level of amenities in the destinations has a strong inﬂuence on
migration behavior. For example, Borjas (1999) documents that the location choices of immigrants to
the United States are aﬀected by interstate dispersions in welfare beneﬁts.
20Of course, dependent migration can also be driven by diﬀerences in amenities in the additive-risk
case. What we have shown in the additive-risk case is that dependents can migrate even if the level of
amenities is not a concern.
25to entry for their professions in the foreign country. On the other hand, if breadwinners
have only home-country-speciﬁc human capital (e.g., certain government oﬃcials) or face
licensing problems in the foreign country (e.g., lawyers, medical doctors, dentists), then
t h e ym a ye x p e r i e n c eas h a r pf a l li ni n c o m ei nt h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r y ,h e n c et h e i rri will
be very low or even negative. In this scenario, dependents will likely migrate ahead of
breadwinners.
Both patterns of family migration can be found in Asia. For example, breadwinner
migration is the most prominent pattern observed in the Philippines. In 1996, the total
number of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) was estimated to be about 900,000, of which
56 percent were males and 44 percent were females (National Statistics Oﬃce 1997). Over
78 percent of OFWs worked in Asia and the Middle East. About 83 percent of female
OFWs worked as service workers (domestic helpers, nurses) while 92 percent of male
OFWs worked as manual workers (production workers, transport equipment operators,
and laborers). OFWs earn substantially more abroad, mainly because of the lack of
employment opportunities in the Philippines. Through cash remittances, this labor-
exporting industry generates a sizeable and steady source of national income for the
Philippines. Female OFWs are probably the largest group of female migrant workers in
the world. Many female Filipinos possess professional and portable skills that are highly
valued in the world labor market. For instance, their proﬁciency in English is a portable
skill that is particularly apt for service work abroad. The high unemployment rate at
home, the high demand for service workers abroad, and the possession of portable skills
are the most important factors for the massive migration of female workers from the
26Philippines.21
In contrast to the persistent and massive breadwinner migration from the Philip-
pines, Hong Kong and Taiwan have experienced signiﬁcant dependent migration in re-
cent decades. Feeling apprehensive about future economic and political developments,
many well-to-do and middle-class families in Hong Kong and Taiwan have moved their
dependents to more stable foreign countries, while the fathers stay in their home coun-
tries to make a living. This pattern is just opposite to breadwinner migration. As this
is a relatively new and recent phenomenon, the evidence is less well-known and not well
documented. In this section, we will present some empirical evidence in more details.
Table 1 reports the number of Hong Kong-born Chinese immigrants in Australia in
1991 by age group and sex. Table 2 displays the population of Hong Kong by age group
and sex. The tables oﬀer two important ﬁndings. First, 22.9% of the Hong Kong im-
migrants in Australia were teenagers, whereas only 14.6% of the Hong Kong population
were teenagers. The diﬀerence between the two percentages suggests that a dispropor-
tional number of teenagers moved, or were moved, to Australia. Second, the sex ratios
of the 30-39 and 40-49 age groups in Australia were 84 and 91, respectively, which were
considerably lower than those in Hong Kong (104 and 117). In other words, there were
substantially more Hong Kong females than males in the 30-49 age group in Australia,
which was exactly the opposite of the situation in Hong Kong. The males in the 30-49 age
group were most likely the breadwinners of their families. The disproportional number
of Hong Kong female immigrants in the 30-49 age group in Australia suggests that many
of their husbands returned to and worked in Hong Kong. These families sent their wives
21There are studies on the impact of the massive out-migration on the well-being of the dependents
left behind, see for example, Cruz (1987).
27and children to Australia, while the husbands stayed in Hong Kong to keep working or
running their businesses.
The phenomenon of female bias is not conﬁned to the Hong Kong immigrants in
Australia. Table 3 presents the sex ratios of two groups of foreign-born population,
namely Hong Kong-born Chinese and Non-Chinese born elsewhere, in Vancouver and
Toronto in 1991. These two cities host the majority of the Hong Kong immigrants in
Canada (Benjamin, Gunderson, and Riddell 1998). For the purpose of comparison, the
corresponding age-speciﬁc sex ratios of the general population in Hong Kong are displayed
i nt h el a s tc o l u m no ft h et a b l e .T h eﬁgures show that there were noticeably more females
than males in the 25-44 and 45-64 age groups among the Hong Kong born-Chinese in
both Vancouver and Toronto. Neither the Non-Chinese foreign-born population in these
two cities nor the general population in Hong Kong exhibited such a strong female bias.
Similar to Tables 1 and 2, the female bias is consistent with our theory of dependent
migration: the breadwinners (husbands) chose to stay in Hong Kong for work or business
purposes, leaving their wives and children in Canada.
Table 3 also reveals an interesting diﬀerence: the female bias in the 25-44 age group
was much more pronounced in Vancouver than Toronto. This diﬀerence is also consistent
with our theory. The geographical distance between Vancouver and Hong Kong is signiﬁ-
cantly shorter than that between Toronto and Hong Kong. There are regular daily direct
non-stop ﬂights between Vancouver and Hong Kong, but not between Toronto and Hong
Kong. Therefore, the lower time and monetary costs of traveling between Vancouver and
Hong Kong enabled the husbands in Hong Kong to visit their families in Vancouver more
often, thereby facilitating this particular pattern of dependent migration. In other words,
28households opting for dependent migration would choose Vancouver over Toronto as their
destination, other things being equal.
Dependent-oriented migration occurs not only among Hong Kong immigrants but also
among Taiwan immigrants in Australia. For example, Ho and Coughlan (1997) report
that the substantially high median age of the Taiwan-born males in Australia is not
consistent with recent migration data on the age of new settlers upon arrival in Australia.
It is not diﬃcult to rationalize why this particular form of dependent migration is popular
among Hong Kong and Taiwan immigrants. Both Hong Kong and Taiwan faced political
and economic uncertainties caused by the impending return of Hong Kong to China in
1997 and the long-standing tensions between Taiwan and China. Diversifying the political
and economic risks is the main impetus for Hong Kong and Taiwan families to migrate
their dependents.
Although our theory of dependent migration can explain the age group and sex ratio
diﬀerentials in Tables 1 and 3, we cannot rule out other alternative explanations on
the basis of these aggregate data. For the age group diﬀerentials, it is possible that a
disproportional number of Hong Kong teenagers went to Australia for better education
opportunities. For the sex ratio diﬀerentials, the female bias can be caused by selective
immigration policies. To alleviate their labor shortage problems, some countries grant
priorities to the importation of certain professionals, such as nurses, secretaries, and
teachers, etc. As these professions tend to be held by females, the selective immigration
policies may unintentionally attract more females than males.22 More disaggregate and
22In the case of Canada, this alternative explanation is rejected by the data in Table 3. If selective
immigration policies produce a female bias, then it should be observed among all the foreign-born
residents in Vancouver and Toronto because Canadian immigration policies are generally worldwide and
not country-speciﬁc. The ﬁnding that only the Hong Kong-born Chinese, but not the Non-Chinese born
elsewhere, exhibit a female bias for the 25-44 and 45-64 age groups in both Vancouver and Toronto
29reﬁned data are needed to test our theory vis-à-vis the alternative hypotheses. Although
such kind of data is not yet available at this moment, various small-scale but in-depth
household interviews of Hong Kong immigrants in Australia, Canada, Singapore, and
other places (see, e.g., Skeldon (1994), Pe-Pua et al. (1996), and Waters (2001)) do ﬁnd
signiﬁcant evidence of dependent migration. These studies lend credence to our theory
of family risk diversiﬁcation.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we characterize the optimal family migration pattern in a utility-maximizing
framework with heterogeneous members and stochastically interdependent markets. We
carry out a comprehensive analysis and obtain the following results: (1) Migration occurs
among members with relatively higher earning potentials abroad; (2) Migration can take
p l a c ee v e ni fm i g r a n t se a r nl e s sa b r o a dand the income risk in the foreign country is also
higher; (3) The incentive to migrate is shown to depend on the wage diﬀerential between
the home and foreign countries, the risk in each country, the costs of migration, and
more importantly the market correlation between the two countries; (4) For families with
dependents, migrating only dependents can be an optimal strategy; and (5) Our model
provides a coherent explanation for both breadwinner-oriented migration and dependent-
oriented migration.
An important aspect of migration that is not dealt with in this paper is return migra-
tion. The motivation behind many migration movements, for example the migration of
Europeans to the United States before World War II and the Hong Kong migration before
1997, were driven by the desire is to shun political risks. After the risks were resolved,
suggests that the bias is not generated from the immigration policies.
30some of the migrants returned to their home countries. Incorporating the possibility of
return migration into our model will complicate but also enrich the analysis.
In addition to return migration, combining both country risks and individual shocks to
account for dependent migration, extending the analysis to more than two countries, and
incorporating information asymmetry on worker’s productivity (as observed by foreign
and domestic employers) are issues worthy of further investigation.
31Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Suppose the family wants to allocate nF members to the foreign country, then U(F) will
be maximized if
P
i∈F ri is maximized because all the other terms on the right-hand side
of (2) are ﬁxed, given nF and nH = n − nF.C l e a r l y , t h e m a x i m u m o f
P
i∈F ri will be
achieved if F contains the ﬁrst nF members of N because they have the highest values
of ri.T h u s ,F = {1,2,...,nF} and H = {nF +1 ,...,n}. In other words, conditional on
nF, then F = {1,2,...,nF} and H = {nF +1 ,...,n} are optimal. Now suppose there
exists an integer l such that ∆Ul−1 > 0 and ∆Ul ≤ 0, 1 ≤ l<n .As ∆Ul is strictly
decreasing in l (see (4)), U({1,2,...,l}) achieves a maximum at l. It follows that n∗
F = l,
F ∗ = {1,2,...,l}, and H∗ = {l +1 ,...,n}. The solution is unique because ∆Ul is strictly
decreasing in l.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
(i) It is straightforward to verify from (3) that ∂∆Ul/∂(ri − c)=1 , ∂∆Ul/∂σ2
F =
−k(2l +1 )< 0, and ∂∆Ul/∂σ2
H = k[2(n − l) − 1] > 0 (because l<n− 1/2).
(ii) Diﬀerentiating (3) with respect to k, ∂∆Ul/∂k = −(2l +1 ) σ2
F +[ 2 ( n − l) − 1]σ2
H −
2(n − 2l − 1)σHF =( 2 l +1 ) ( σHF − σ2
F)+[ 2 ( n − l) − 1](σ2
H − σHF). If σ2
H > σHF > σ2
F,
then ∂∆Ul/∂k>0. If σ2
H < σHF < σ2
F, then ∂∆Ul/∂k<0.









{a/[n(n +1 ) ] }{(2l +1 ) σ2
F − [2(n − l) − 1]σ2
H +2 ( n − 2l − 1)σHF +2 n(σ2
H − σHF)} =
a(2l +1 ) ( σ2
F + σ2
H − 2σHF)/[n(n +1 ) ]=a(2l +1 ) V (εF − εH)/[n(n +1 ) ]> 0.
(iv) It is obvious from (3) that ∂∆Ul/∂σHF = −2k(n − 2l − 1) R 0 if and only if
l R (n − 1)/2.
Proof of lim
n→∞(a/n)V (I)=∞
There are two cases to consider in the proof: σHF 6= σHσF and σHF = σHσF.
32(i) Suppose σHF 6= σHσF (the country risks are not perfectly correlated). By assumption,
V (εF − εH)=σ2
F + σ2





F +( n − nF)
2σ
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V (εF − εH)
.
It follows that lim








(ii) Suppose σHF = σHσF (the country risks are perfectly positively correlated). In this
case, V (I)=[ nFσF +( n − nF)σH]
2 ≥ n2 min{σH,σF}, hence lim
n→∞
(a/n)V (I)=∞.
It follows from cases (i) and (ii) that, regardless of the choice of nF, lim
n→∞
(a/n)V (I)=∞
if the country risks are not perfectly negatively correlated.
Note: If σHF = −σHσF (the country risks are perfectly negatively correlated), then
V (I)=[ nFσF − (n − nF)σH]
2 , which does not have a positive lower bound. For in-
stance, if nF = nσH/(σH + σF), then V (I)=0 . Therefore, whether lim
n→∞
(a/n)V (I)=∞
depends on the choice of nF. If nF =0or n, then lim
n→∞
(a/n)V (I)=∞.I f nF =
nσH/(σH + σF)+π for some constant π that does not depend on n, then V (I)=
[π(σF − σH)]
2 , thus lim
n→∞
(a/n)V (I)=0 .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Suﬃciency: Condition (C4b) implies that there must be at least one migrant. Conditions
(C4a) and (C4c) imply that no productive members will migrate because (4) implies that
∆Um0+1 < ∆Um0 ≤ 0, hence the (m0 +1 ) -st member (i.e., the ﬁrst productive member)
must stay home. Hence, F ∗ ⊆ M0.
Necessity: Suppose F∗ ⊆ M0, i.e., there are m∗ migrants and they are all dependents,
0 <m ∗ ≤ m0. By Proposition 1, this implies (C4a), (C4b), ∆Um∗−1 > 0, and ∆Um∗ ≤ 0.
Clearly, ∆Um0 = ∆Um∗ if m∗ = m0, and ∆Um0 < ∆Um∗ ≤ 0 if m∗ <m 0 (by (4)), thus
(C4c) follows.
33P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
Assume (C5a) hj − ht is suﬃciently small for any j 6= t, j,t ∈ N,a n d( C 5 b )σF is
suﬃciently small. Using (13), the utility of migrating the members in F as well as











































For j, t ∈ H, t > j, the family will migrate j instead of t (t/ ∈ F) if
U(F ∪ {j}) − U(F ∪ {t})
= rj − rt
−k
("Ã




























Since hi−hi+1 is suﬃciently small, thus ri ≥ ri+1 implies that fi ≥ fi+1,i=1 ,2,...,n−
1.T h eﬁrst term in the brace is negligible if σ2
F is small enough. The second term in the
brace is negative because σHF − σHσF < 0 and fj >f t. As a result, the risk term in the
brace is negative. Moreover, since rj ≥ rt for j<t ,w eh a v eU(F ∪{j})−U(F ∪{t}) > 0.
This implies that if t is to migrate, j must have already migrated. The optimal allocation
of the family members is therefore F ∗ = {1,2,...,n∗
F} and H∗ = {n∗
F +1 ,n ∗
F +2 ,...,n}.
Next, we show that ∆Ul is decreasing in l if (C5a) and (C5b) hold. Let F = {1,2,...,l},
then using (13),










































































The (n +1 )-st member will migrate if ∆Ul > 0. It is straightforward but tedious to
show that
∆Ul − ∆Ul−1 = rl+1 − rl − k



































which is negative if both σF and hl+1 − hl are suﬃciently small. Hence, ∆Ul is strictly
decreasing in l.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,F ∗ = {1,2,...,n∗
F} and H∗ = {n∗
F +1 ,...,n}.
If j is a dependent, then fj = hj =0and ∆Uj−1 = −c<0. Thus, dependents will
never migrate and migration takes place only among the productive members.
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37Table 1
Hong Kong-born Chinese Immigrants in Australia by Age Group and Sex, 1991
Age group (years) Males Females Both Sexes Sex ratio
0-9 2509 (8.9) 2489 (8.5) 4998 (8.7) 101
10-19 6924 (24.5) 6230 (21.3) 13154 (22.9) 111
20-29 6492 (23.0) 6842 (23.3) 13334 (23.2) 95
30-39 6478 (22.9) 7686 (26.2) 14164 (24.6) 84
40-49 3358 (11.9) 3707 (12.6) 7065 (12.3) 91
50-59 1546 (5.5) 1276 (4.4) 2822 (4.9) 121
60 and over 930 (3.3) 1083 (3.7) 2013 (3.5) 86
Total 28237 (100) 29313 (100) 57550 (100) 96
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are percentages. Sex ratio = Number of males per 100 females.
Source: Kee and Skeldon (1994, Table 10.2).
Table 2
Hong Kong Population by Age Group and Sex, 1991
Age group (years) Males Females Both Sexes Sex ratio
0-9 404700 (13.8) 374400 (13.3) 779100 (13.5) 108
10-19 436000 (14.8) 401200 (14.3) 837200 (14.6) 109
20-29 521700 (17.8) 531000 (18.9) 1052700 (18.3) 98
30-39 583500 (19.9) 559000 (19.9) 1142500 (19.9) 104
40-49 364800 (12.4) 311300 (11.1) 676100 (11.8) 117
50-59 280600 (9.6) 238300 (8.5) 518900 (9.0) 118
60 and over 346900 (11.8) 398600 (14.2) 745500 (13.0) 87
Total 2938200 (100) 2813800 (100) 5752000 (100) 104
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are percentages. Sex ratio = Number of males per 100 females.
Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (1998, Table 1.2).
Table 3
Sex Ratios of Hong Kong-born Chinese and Non-Chinese
born elsewhere in Vancouver and Toronto, 1991
Vancouver Toronto
Age group Hong Kong-born Non-Chinese Hong Kong-born Non-Chinese Hong Kong
(years) Chinese born elsewhere Chinese born elsewhere
0-14 114 104 111 105 108
15-24 99 102 112 102 104
2 5 - 4 4 8 59 9 9 29 6 1 0 4
45-64 92 102 93 98 116
6 5 a n d o v e r 8 67 3 7 27 37 9
T o t a l 9 29 8 9 79 6 1 0 4
Note: Sex ratio = Number of males per 100 females.
Sources: Skeldon (1997, Table 11.2), Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (1998, Table 1.2).
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